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Freedom unquestionably continues to be a major theme of modern life and thought.  Whether it is the political freedom of nations and groups within nations, or greater social freedom of individuals and/or groups within given societies, the topic figures large in current discourse.  For Christians, and for others as well who may be affected by what Christians think and do, it is worthwhile to note how freedom is treated in the New Testament (NT), as this body of texts has a central significance in shaping Christian thought and behaviour.  Moreover, as we shall see, freedom was in fact also a major topic in the ancient Roman period of the NT writers, and so it is not an anachronistic question to ask how the topic is handled in these texts.​[2]​  
	The main point of this particular essay is to posit that the treatment of “freedom” in the NT is notable in emphasizing freedom for a certain direction in life, rather than simply freedom from circumstances or other people.  This is not a totally new observation.  More specifically, however, I intend to show that the NT emphasis is that believers are set free and enabled to engage others in agapē.  In this, I contend, the NT is distinguishable from dominant treatments of freedom in the Roman era, and in our era as well.  Indeed this idea of freedom-for-love is so distinguishable as perhaps to render it practically unrecognizable as freedom in the eyes of those for whom Greek and Roman ideas were decisive.  I will also propose that this NT emphasis also provides a potentially productive and noteworthy line of thought for Christian participation in, and discussions about, freedom in the current scene.  In the final paragraphs of this essay, I offer some concluding reflections on how the treatment of freedom in the NT might suggest directions of thought and action by Christians today.

Freedom in the Historical Context
Before we turn to the NT, however, and precisely to see more clearly the specific contours of how freedom is treated in these texts, it is worthwhile first to give some attention to the traditions that formed the larger intellectual and cultural environment of earliest Christianity.  In view of several previous and thorough studies, it is sufficient here to sketch matters briefly.​[3]​
We may begin with the national-political connotation of “freedom” and what it means for a nation or people to be free in that sense.  In Greek tradition especially, there was a strong emphasis on this, memorably associated with resistance to the might of the Persians.​[4]​  By the first century CE, however, Roman military adventures and expansion had produced conquest and colonization of many peoples and territories, and Rome was very conscious of being the victor, not the vanquished.  Emblems and monuments to Roman victory and enforced peace were frequent and widely displayed.​[5]​  It is obvious, thus, that the conquered and colonized peoples were well aware of their status as such, and that any collective ethnic or national freedom eluded them under the weight of Roman force.  Consequently, it is not surprising that one does not see much reference to ideas of ethnic freedom in Roman-era texts.  
Indeed, to my knowledge, the only salient expressions of the ideal of national freedom (from Rome), and the expressions that clearly proved the greatest worry to Roman authorities as well, were those from Jewish resistance movements.  As Martin Hengel has shown, in the artefacts from, and reports on, these movements, which produced a series of revolts including two major wars aimed to achieve liberation from Rome, the ideal of national “freedom” figures prominently.​[6]​  Unfortunately, much NT scholarship on freedom in the NT has overlooked the emphasis on freedom in Jewish circles of the day.  NT scholars may note Philo’s references to freedom, but usually as an instance of Greek influence upon Diaspora Jews.  The use of the term by Jewish freedom-fighters in Roman Palestine, however, shows that there is much more in the Jewish tradition than usually reckoned with by NT scholars.
To understand fully the stance of these Jewish resistance groups, we have to take account of the strongly religious character of the freedom that they sought.  They were not simply nationalists in some modern sense of the term.  As Hengel noted, it is undoubtedly significant that the coins of the revolts speak of the “Freedom of Zion” and “Freedom of Jerusalem,” not, e.g., “Freedom of Israel”.​[7]​  These inscriptions suggest that the focus of concern was profoundly religious, for Jerusalem as the temple-city to be free of pagan/gentile influence; and “freedom” meant what we would call “religious” freedom to be responsible and fully faithful solely to the God of Israel, owning God alone as the rightful king.  That is, for these Jewish resistance groups “freedom” primarily involved being free of anything (e.g., taxation paid to Rome) that limited or seemed to compromise in any way God’s sole rule.  Put more positively, for them, freedom meant the full realization of God’s own rule, which included social and political dimensions.  
In short, this “freedom” was obviously an eschatological hope and condition, even if, as these Jewish resistance groups seemed to have believed, their own direct actions were necessary in contributing to the fulfilment of this eschatological vision.  This idea of a future “freedom” probably draws on the OT them that God freed Israel from “the land of Egypt . . . the house of slavery” (e.g., Jer. 34:13; Micah 6:4).  Moreover, as we shall see shortly, this particular view of freedom as eschatological blessing will be more important than is sometimes appreciated in considering some NT passages, such as Romans 8:18-25 (esp. v. 21).
There were also a few Roman voices raised in support of traditional ideas of the rights and freedoms of Roman citizens, and in lament over the erosion of these rights and freedoms in the transition from the Republic to Empire.  Among these voices, Cicero is perhaps the best known, but a somewhat similar standpoint is also reflected in Tacitus.​[8]​  However, it does not really appear that this sort of discourse involved more than those who were among the traditionally social-elite of Rome who objected to the negative effects upon their own privileges that resulted from the emergence of imperial structures.
By far, the most common notion of freedom in the Roman period was to designate social/legal status, especially the pervasive distinction between free(d) persons and slaves.  In Roman-era societies, slavery was a common and familiar social and legal category, its often ugly and always demeaning effects well known.  Indeed, slaves comprised a major part of the human population of the Empire, and particularly in wealthier agrarian estates and urban households easily outnumbered those who owned them.  In this ironic situation of ubiquitous slavery and universal abhorrence of being a slave, to be “free” meant, most commonly and explicitly, not to be a slave.  By definition, in Roman law a slave was responsible fully to the demands of the master/mistress, with no valid will of his/her own recognized.​[9]​  The common reference to slaves as sw&mata (bodies) in Greek texts of the time reflects the view that they are essentially physical resources available to the owner, mere instruments with no other significance.​[10]​  
Quite understandably, therefore, the free person took pleasure and pride in not being in this demeaning status.  Those born free were proud never to have been in the subject condition, and freedmen and freedwomen were glad to be delivered from it.  Epictetus (a former slave himself) wrote: “Does freedom seem to you to be a good thing?  Yes, indeed, the greatest”.​[11]​  In fact, one might even say that the meaning of “free(dom)” in Roman times can scarcely be understood adequately without the contrasting condition of slavery.  It is not going too far to judge that the ubiquitous place of slavery and its well-known features likely help account for the considerable place given to the discussion of personal freedom in Roman-era texts.  I note, for instance, that in Epictetus’ Discourses, by far the largest section (4.1., some 177 verses in the Loeb edition) deals with the topic.​[12]​  To cite another example from a very different social quarter, there is Philo’s substantial treatise, “Every Good Man is Free”.​[13]​  Consequently, later in this essay, in the interest of rooting our discussion of freedom in the NT in the specific cultural setting in which NT texts were written, we shall give some sustained attention to references to slaves/slavery and to the use of related terminology.
As a third type of discourse about freedom, there is also the philosophical development of the idea of freedom (e.g., Stoic tradition) as an inner state in which, by diligent cultivation of the right frame of mind, one regarded oneself as free and sovereign within, whatever one’s outward situation.  In this notion, one disregarded in varying ways the outer world and focused on the internal, subjective realm.  In the Cynic vision of such freedom, one treats with complete disdain all social conventions and any attempt by others to manipulate or direct one’s way of life.  The ultimate ideal freedom in these philosophical circles is to be free from fear, especially fear of death, a freedom which gives one full scope for action without regard for the consequences.  
	It is important to note that in all these preceding types of freedom as treated in Roman-era texts, the dominant emphasis is on autarchy, the ability of a people or an individual to be master of choices and actions, not dictated to by, or bound to regard, anyone else.  To cite again one of the most generous thinkers of the Roman period, Epictetus, “He is free who lives as he wills, who is subject neither to compulsion, nor hindrance, nor force, whose choices are unhampered, whose desires attain their end.”​[14]​  Or, to cite an old Greek saying, “The free man is one who lives as he chooses.”​[15]​  We may also note Philo’s characterization of freedom as obeying no orders and working no will but one’s own.​[16]​  
It is important to note that in this sort of view, others (whether other nations, social groups, or individuals) are essentially always a real or potential threat to one’s freedom, or at best are an unavoidable constraint upon the scope of one’s freedom.  So, for example, in some Greek philosophical discussions of the ideal polis, although it may be necessary to agree certain limitations upon the exercise and scope of individual freedom (these limitations expressed in nomoj) to avoid social conflict and tyranny.  But, however practical and necessary this may be, it is still seen as a diminution of individuals’ freedom.  As I shall demonstrate shortly, this makes for interesting comparison with the religious notions of “freedom” that we encounter in the NT, in which other people play a very different role, and are, in fact, positively constitutive to true freedom.

Freedom in the New Testament​[17]​
We may begin our analysis of freedom in the NT with the basic question of just how much of a place notions of freedom have in these texts.  If, as in some previous studies, this question is addressed simply on the basis of occurrences of the Greek words which are translated directly as “freedom” (e)leuqeri&a), “free” (e)leu&qeroj), and “set free” (e)leuqerou=n), then one could conclude that the idea of freedom is heavily Pauline and not otherwise all that important in the rest of the NT.​[18]​  As any concordance will show, the Pauline corpus accounts for sixteen of the twenty-three uses of e)leu&qeroj, seven of the eleven uses of e)leuqeri&a, and five of the seven uses of e)leuqero&w.  Moreover, except for the two uses of e)leu&qeroj in Ephesians 6:8 and Colossians 3:11, all of the remainder of the Pauline uses of these three terms are in the Hauptbriefe.  So they are unquestionably authentic words in Pauline vocabulary, and more frequently used by Paul than by other NT authors.  On this basis, Niederwimmer judged, “In diesem Sinne ist Freiheit wesentlich ein ‘paulinische’ Begriff.”​[19]​
	But to restrict attention to these three terms falls considerably short of an adequate consideration of all the terms relevant for an analysis of what we may characterize as the “discourse concept” of “freedom” in the NT.​[20]​  A “discourse concept” may be comprised of a number of words (“lexemes”), and not only words that are etymologically related.  For example, “upward” and “downward,” “left” and “right” are obvious (in this case, contrasting) components in a discourse concept of “direction,” just as “affection,” “endearment,” and “fondness” are among the components in a discourse concept of “love”.  So, a concept of “freedom” may be reflected in sentences that do not even use the words “freedom” or “free”.  
	To illustrate this point, the terms lutro&w, lu&tron, a)nti&lutron, a)polu&trwsij, lu&trwsij, and lutrwth&j all have associations with the liberation of captives and slaves by payment of some fee or ransom.  Likewise, the words e)cousi&a and e)cestin can be used to refer to the right/freedom of action characteristic of a “free” person, as distinguished from the captive will of a slave.  The term parrhsi&a can denote the boldness and freedom to speak that pertains to a free person.  As noted already, in the Roman period “freedom” was most readily defined as the opposite of slavery.  So, clearly, if we wish to grasp the full discourse concept of “freedom” in Greek texts of that era, we simply must take account of these terms as well as those more customarily considered.
	Although space does not permit here a detailed discussion, it is clear that references to ideas and images of “freedom” are more frequent, more important, and more widely distributed in the NT than might at first appear.​[21]​  For example, if we simply take account of lutron and cognate words, the great majority of uses of this word-group lie outside the Pauline corpus, and are scattered among several NT authors.​[22]​  Furthermore, the uses of these terms in these texts with a religious sense, to refer to God’s redemption of Israel and/or Christian believers, indicates how “freedom” quickly assumed a major place in articulating soteriological hopes and beliefs.  To cite another example in support of this point, Paul’s reference to Jesus as having come to “redeem [e)cagora&sh|] those who were under the Law” (Gal 4:5) so that they might no longer be slaves but fully-entitled as heirs (“sons”) appropriates ancient notions of debt-slaves and freedom in order to make a vivid soteriological point.

Political and Social Freedom
	It will be disappointing to many moderns, however, that there is scant overt reference to the political idea of freedom in the NT.  That is, it is very difficult to find any direct reference in the NT to aspirations for political enfranchisement and political rights as we know them today.  There is, e.g., no encouragement to mount overt resistance to the regnant Roman regime or to organize to secure change of the political system.  Of course, this probably reflects the Roman historical situation in which Roman rule was widely deemed sufficiently tolerable, or at least was unavoidable, serious change in political structures was in any case judged completely unfeasible, and revolt was deemed unlikely to succeed or (for religious reasons specific to early Christian faith) inappropriate to contemplate.  On the other hand, in the NT (most explicitly in Revelation), we certainly have indications of a longing for a “regime change”, and even the expectation that it was certainly to come.  But, the perception of the endemic nature of evil in political structures and more broadly in society meant that any genuine change for the better could come in reality only through divine intervention.  So, for many early Christians, the prayer-petition, “Your kingdom come,” appears to have expressed a sincere longing for radical change from the often dismal experience of human rule.  But there was scant confidence that this longing could be answered by human political action.  Instead, God’s kingdom would require divine action to establish it.
	In short, one factor accounting for the apparent lack of interest in attempting to promote greater political freedom through some sort of social or political movement was, obviously, the strong eschatological outlook characteristic in the NT.  Paul, for example, seems to have looked fervently for Jesus’ return in power and glory (e.g., 1 Thess 4:13—5:11), which would also involve divine “wrath” upon all evil; and it is apparently this hope that Paul alludes to in his passing reference to the transitory nature of the “rulers of this age” (1 Cor. 2:8).  Nevertheless, and although he could also express a certain disdain for the civil courts and urged Corinthian believers to handle their differences with one another without recourse to “the unrighteous,” Paul does not provide any hint of a programme of wider political action intended, for example, to achieve greater enfranchisement of believers, or anyone else for that matter.  
	Yet it would be anachronistic and unfair to complain about this lack of any programme of political action in the NT.  These texts were written in a time when popular movements for democratic enfranchisement were simply not in view by anyone.  Moreover, we should remember that those few in the ancient world who did advocate what at first appears to be “democracy” typically meant enfranchisement and a certain political equality only for free, white males.  We should not unduly romanticize the ancients!  
It would also be mistaken to ascribe this lack of a political programme of change in the NT simply to a socially conservative mindset of the authors of these texts.  Paul, for example, should not be confused with Seneca!  Granted, Paul accepts the political structures of his time as simply the reality of the day, and can even appreciate some of the potential benefits (and so, e.g., he can advise respect for authorities and the paying of taxes, Rom. 13:1-7).  Moreover, as a consistent monotheist he had to see everything as in one way or another ordained or at least permitted by God, and also answerable to God.  So his advice hardly sprang from a political conservatism allergic to change in social structures.  Instead, he clearly longed for the radical change that he associates with Jesus’ Parousia.  Indeed, Paul’s eschatological outlook represents a far more significant qualification of earthly political and social structures than is sometime realized today, perhaps because for most modern readers of Paul (whether Christian or not) his futurist eschatology is foreign and embarrassing, and thus difficult to engage with the necessary critical sympathy.​[23]​
	Also, it is a simplistic outlook, whether of arch-conservative or arch-liberal variety, that makes decisive in some way this lack of an explicit authorization of political action in the NT, the one seeking to justify political and social conservatism today, and the other hastily judging the NT irrelevant for contemporary Christian life and thought.  The Christian message first circulated in, and was articulated with reference to, that specific ancient time and cultural setting, as had to be the case for it to be meaningful and relevant.  Consequently, for example, we should not expect direct teaching on how Christians are to exercise the political responsibilities and opportunities that are afforded only in modern, liberal democracies.  But, as I hope to show later in this study, we should also not imagine that the lack of such direct teaching means that the NT has little to offer to moderns in grappling with questions of what “freedom” might mean.
	Likewise, in my view, the treatment of slaves/slavery in the NT, which has received focused attention in some recent studies, can easily be mishandled.​[24]​  We are the beneficiaries of a renewed scholarly interest in, and also significant revisions of scholarly views about, slavery in the Roman world.  The net effect of this work includes a wider scholarly recognition that, however diverse the experience of it, slavery was ubiquitous and always, though in various ways and degrees, a demeaning, and often quite a degrading and monstrous, violation of those enslaved.​[25]​  As noted earlier, it is therefore all the more important to observe with care what attitudes toward slaves and slavery may be reflected in the NT.  Unfortunately, however, at least some recent discussions of these matters appear to me to misjudge matters seriously.​[26]​  
	The first observation is that, indisputably, there is no NT text directly condemning slavery or openly urging Christians against holding slaves.  But the question is what to make of this.  That is, does this lack of an explicit condemnation of slavery adequately represent all that the NT offers on the subject?  Moreover, what implications should we draw in considering how Christians have sometimes used the NT to justify slavery and other practices?​[27]​  Slavery was enshrined in the legal system of the Roman period, and it would have amounted to an open attack upon that whole system to seek to abolish slavery.  Indeed, there was no mechanism or precedent for such an objective, and I know of no such effort anywhere in the time of the NT authors.  Let us remember, after all, that the efforts to abolish slavery in Britain and then the United States were not finally successful until well into the modern period (in the USA not quite 150 years ago), after long struggles, and only because these nations had come to adopt varying forms of democratic systems that permitted open efforts to change laws through political processes.  Orlando Patterson’s observation about Paul and his cultural setting is applicable generally to the NT:
The truth of the matter is that Paul neither defended nor condemned the system of slavery, for the simple reason that in the first-century Roman imperial world in which he lived the abolition of slavery was intellectually inconceivable, and socially, politically and economically impossible.​[28]​
	Yet, here again, we should also take seriously the eschatological stance everywhere reflected in the NT.  The full manifestation of God’s kingdom which was fervently hoped for surely meant the abolition of slavery and all other distinctions used to make inferior, to oppress and to exploit others.  The entire body of elect were to enjoy fully “the freedom of the glory of the children [te&knwn] of God” (Rom. 8:21), and in Revelation believers are all to be “a kingdom and priests to God” (Rev. 1:6).​[29]​  So, although Patterson is correct that abolition of slavery by social/political action was “intellectually inconceivable” in that time, the ending of slavery was certainly conceived as one happy feature of the eagerly expected eschatological redemption to be consummated with Christ’s return.
	Moreover, although slavery is not challenged as a legal institution in the NT, these texts do reflect attitudes and values that, if acted upon, made at least for the amelioration of slave-status.  Most significantly, of course, was the acceptance of slaves along with the free(d) as full co-religionists, one’s “brothers” and “sisters”, in the e)kklhsi&ai.  Certainly, there were also some other voluntary associations in which slaves could be included, although slaves were usually required to obtain the permission of their owners to be enrolled in these groups.​[30]​  But the evidence suggests that churches typically included slaves.  This regular inclusion of slaves in itself represents an important and tangible expression of acceptance of those who were slaves as full co-religionists, fellow members of God’s family, joint recipients of God’s mercy and of Christ’s redemptive work.​[31]​
	Furthermore, a number of texts reflect a view that believers’ status as slave or free was not to exercise the usual effects, either in their relationship with other believers in the church or in how they regarded themselves.  This is surely the intended import of Paul’s comments in 1 Cor. 7:21-24, which do not represent a callous indifference or a naïve view of what slavery could mean.  Instead, Paul expresses here a profound, new basis for one’s identity and outlook toward others.  These statements directed to slaves and free are part of a larger body of exhortation in 1 Cor. 7:17-31 (indeed, perhaps to the end of 1 Cor. 7) that urges believers not to define themselves or others by their social conditions (circumcised/uncircumcised, vv. 17-20; slave/free, vv. 21-24; married/unmarried, vv. 25-31), whatever their own particular situation.  Both the slave and the free person are to transcend the powerful effects of the Roman honor-shame culture, and to take up a new stance toward themselves and others, one that is defined by their mutual calling by/to God.  That God has called both slaves and free(d) to comprise the elect signals a divine refusal to observe the typical function of these legal/social categories, and so believers are to shape their own attitudes and behavior accordingly.  Thus, Paul’s encouragement to Christian slaves to think of themselves as free in the Lord, and his exhortation to the free that they are Christ’s slaves (v. 22) do not to validate and “reinscribe” the slave/free structures of Roman society.  Instead, Paul’s words here manifest a bold and potentially powerful subversion of the normal meaning of “slave” and “free”, and the honor-shame categories that the terms typically represented.
	In this light, we can take seriously the well-known statements in Gal. 3:28 and Col. 3:11, in which various polarities of nation, gender and social/legal status that were so central in defining people and their relationships in the wider society are not to exercise these effects within the churches.  Of course, first-century Christians did not cease to be Jew or Gentile, male or female, slave or free; yet believers were to see themselves and one another first and foremost as “one in Christ Jesus,” and as all belonging to Christ.  However imperfectly this outlook was actualized in early Christian circles and subsequently (and there is no denying a regrettably frequent failure to exhibit this outlook), I contend that the nature of these exhortations should not be discounted.​[32]​  They provide a potentially powerful body of teaching that can be drawn upon in churches to re-awaken the vision of them as circles that model and prefigure eschatological freedom.
	To be sure, the NT exhortations to slaves to obey their masters with diligence (e.g., Eph. 6:5-8; Col. 3:22-25; 1 Pet. 2:18-25) show an acquiescence to the social and legal realities of slavery.  But in each of these passages we also have efforts to re-define radically for Christian slaves their situation, and to give them their own new sense of who they were and of what they could make of a condition that could not otherwise be changed by them.  So, although in Roman law they were the possession of their human owners, Christian slaves were to re-orient themselves as rendering their service to Christ, their true Kyrios, in the sure hope that their efforts will receive Christ’s reward, however their earthly owners may react (Eph. 6:6-8; Col. 3:23-24).  We should note that this sort of exhortation effectively treats slaves as moral agents, and offers them at least a conceptual means to re-signify for themselves the performance of duties that they could not avoid.  
	In 1 Pet. 2:18-25, Christian slaves who may suffer unjustly at the hands of their masters (which in the context appears to mean suffering related in some way to their faith) are to see themselves as aligned with Christ’s sufferings.​[33]​  This association with Christ was obviously intended to give Christian slaves an ennobled sense of themselves, and to strengthen their resolve to “do right and suffer for it” (v. 20).  That is, the passage gives Christian slaves a new self-understanding (the significance of which should not be underestimated), and also an implicit authorization to act as moral agents, to identify for themselves what is “right” and to stand by their moral judgement courageously.
	We should also note carefully the equally striking exhortations to Christian owners of slaves (Eph. 6:9; Col. 4:1; and similarly in Did. 4.10; Barn. 19.7).  On the one hand, these statements obviously show that Christians continued to hold slaves, and that there was no Christian programme of emancipation in that time.  On the other hand, the tone of these exhortations is significant.  The dominant view in Roman society was that fear and intimidation (overt or subtle, depending on the circumstances) was the best means of handling slaves and ensuring their obedience.  But the author of Ephesians urges Christian slave-owners to break with this practice and to treat their slaves as their fellow-servants of the same heavenly Master, who shows no partiality to social status (Eph. 6:9).​[34]​  Also, in Col. 4:1, Christian slave-owners are ordered to treat their slaves “justly and fairly”, in the knowledge that slave-owners as well as slaves will answer for their conduct to the same heavenly Master.  
To invoke shared standards of justice and fairness in the treatment of slaves was, in the Roman setting, remarkable, even something that many non-Christians may have seen as nonsensical.  The more common view was that slaves were one’s property, to use or dispose of as one pleased.  But that only helps us to perceive the true import of these exhortations.  To cite also a couple of early extra-canonical texts, in Did. 4.10 and Barn. 19.7 Christian masters are specifically warned not to give orders to their slaves when angry, lest this cause the slaves to turn from their faith in God.​[35]​  
	Of course, probably the most familiar NT text in discussions of slavery and freedom is Philemon.  The traditional view, that Onesimus was Philemon’s slave, whom Paul sends back as courier of this letter, asking Philemon to receive him now as a Christian brother, has come in for vigorous disputation in some recent studies.​[36]​  Although it is not clear that Onesimus was a fugitive slave, I remain persuaded that he was likely Philemon’s slave, which makes the epistle an important text for us to consider, albeit briefly.​[37]​
	The first thing to note is that Paul treats Onesimus as a full co-religionist, even referring to him tenderly as “my own child” (v. 10) and “my own heart [spla&gxna]” (v. 12).  Moreover, Paul urges Philemon to receive Onesimus as “a beloved brother” (v. 16) and as Paul himself (v. 17).  Other than requesting that any debt be charged to him instead of Onesimus (v. 18), Paul does not spell out what precisely all this should mean in Philemon’s conduct toward his slave.​[38]​  But, of course, Paul says that he did not wish to command Philemon directly, preferring instead that Philemon have the opportunity to act out of his own volition (vv. 8, 14).  
As numerous others have judged, however, it seems very likely that one of Paul’s particular hopes in this situation was that Philemon would allow Onesimus to go back to Paul, to serve Paul on behalf of Philemon (v. 13).  This request is never formally made, but the coy expression of confidence that Philemon will do “even more than the things I have said” (v. 21) is probably a further hint of Paul’s wish.  Whether this would have involved Onesimus being manumitted or simply seconded to Paul, I cannot say with confidence.  But there is certainly no reason to exclude Onesimus’ manumission from Paul’s hopes, and, in my view, this is at least as likely as the alternative.​[39]​ 
In any case, this carefully-crafted epistle radiates attitudes that work against Roman notions of slavery, and that at least implicitly, and within the constraints of the legal system of that day, promote the dignity and freedom of action of all concerned, including the slave Onesimus.  Granted, he has no voice in this letter, because as a slave he had no legal standing from which to speak.  But Paul’s intercession on his behalf gives Onesimus a new status, as Paul’s dear child, and as a beloved brother to Paul and Philemon, a status that derives from and invokes the Christian faith that unites him with Paul and with his owner.  Certainly, this new status seems intended to have profound effects upon Onesimus’ former status as slave.  
Moreover, by making his intercession to Philemon an open and public matter, Paul effectively disregards the legal status of Onesimus as the private property of Philemon.  Timothy is included as co-sender, and five others are named as sending greetings (vv. 23-24, and thus aware that Paul is writing to Philemon).  Also, Apphia (Philemon’s “sister” or wife?), Archippus, and all the house-church are included as recipients of the letter, which likely means that it was expected to be read out in the gathered church.  In making the treatment of Onesimus an ecclesial matter, Paul thus effectively over-rides the Roman legal system with a new ethos and set of values.
	In sum, the major relevance of the NT with regard to social and political freedom is not to provide a precedent or programme of liberation to be achieved by such measures as collective social or political action; but this should not blind us to the other ways in which the NT reflects a concern for real freedom of persons.  There are notable expressions of a desire to transcend negative social categories within the ekklesia, particularly the ways that slave/free distinctions operated in the larger Roman environment.  Also, the strong eschatological vision reflected in the NT, which includes a relativization of the Roman imperial structures, and the hope of their replacement with God’s beneficent and ennobling kingdom, comprises a radical alternative allegiance and value-system in which “freedom” for all the elect can feature as an important aspiration.​[40]​  

Spiritual and Moral Freedom
This subtle but far-reaching subversion of Roman-era slave/free categories, and the implicit refusal of Roman imperial claims of finality and divinity in favor of an alternate definition of a divine kingdom yet to come are linked to other indications of radical dimensions of “freedom” in the NT.  

The Spirit and Freedom 
	At least until very recently, most scholarly discussions of “freedom” in the NT have focused on predictable theological issues shaped very much by the history of theological debate:  freedom/bondage of the human will, freedom from the (Jewish) Law, and freedom of ethical action/choice in disputed matters of behavior among Christians.​[41]​  In what follows, I shall touch on these matters, but here also brevity is necessary.  
	We have noted earlier that “freedom” is one of the terms by which the eschatological hope of redemption is articulated, particularly in Rom. 8:18-25; and I have already observed that this eschatological vision is shaped by OT and Jewish ideas of “freedom” as both God’s redemptive gift (the Exodus story of Israel’s liberation from “the house of slavery” crucial) and also as freedom for the service of God (e.g., Exod. 7:16).  In the NT, God’s Spirit is typically the medium by which God’s redemption (itself a synonym of “freedom”) is actualized in and through believers, and so we have statements linking freedom with the Spirit.  
	Among these, Paul’s epigram in 2 Cor. 3:17, “where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom,” expresses this connection pithily.  In the immediate context, Paul emphasizes that Christ’s glory relativizes Moses and the Torah as expressions of God’s revelation (3:7-16), and Paul laments both Jewish inability to see this as well as pagan blindness to Christ (4:1-4).  So, the freedom mentioned in 3:17 likely involves a cognitive liberation from any outlook that prevents recognition of Jesus’ glory.  This includes a specific freedom from viewing Torah as a revelation that adequately defines God’s will, which would make Jesus irrelevant or secondary.
	In Rom. 8:1-4, also, the Spirit is directly credited with mediating to believers a freedom from “the law of sin and of death” (v. 2).​[42]​  Here as well, the Spirit makes operative in believers the work of God in Christ (v. 3), enabling them to exhibit “the just requirement of the law” in their behavior (v. 4).  A bit later in the chapter, Paul employs other terms in the discourse-concept of freedom, identifying those led by the Spirit as God’s adopted children (vv. 14-15), whose Spirit-prompted appeal to God as “Abba! Father!” expresses their new noble status, which includes being fully “heirs of God” with Christ (v. 17).
	Immediately thereafter (vv. 18-25), Paul contrasts “the sufferings of the present time” with the surpassing glory to be revealed to/for believers.  Here, Paul envisions a freedom from the “bondage to decay,” that is, from mortality itself, which afflicts all creation (including believers’ mortal bodies).  This future status will involve participation in “the freedom of the glory of the children of God” (v. 21), which Paul particularly defines here as bodily redemption (i.e., eschatological resurrection).  As indicated already, Rom. 8:18-25 makes especially clear the important eschatological dimension in the NT idea of freedom.  In short, the freedom aspired to in the NT simply exceeds any earthly capacity to provide it.
	Yet Paul also declares and urges real manifestations of this eschatological freedom in the present, mortal life and the social life of believers.  In Rom. 6:1-23, he mixes slave/free and death/life categories to contrast the serious behavioral differences that believers should exhibit in comparison to their pre-Christian past.  Here also, in Paul’s use of slave/free imagery, we see his Jewish background reflected, for he describes believers as freed from slavery to sin so that they now might be at God’s service (vv. 12-14, 17-23).​[43]​  This freedom is not autarchy, but freedom for fulfilling the will of God.
	It is very important to note that this freedom of service for God, which Paul can describe vividly as believers becoming “slaves to righteousness” (vv. 18-19), is exhibited characteristically in inter-personal behavior.  Granted, Paul does not define sin or righteousness in Romans 6, but wherever he does so it is in terms of how one behaves toward others.  For instance, in Gal. 5:16-26, the “works of the flesh” and “fruit of the Spirit” comprise lists of vices and virtues respectively in which inter-personal actions and attitudes loom large.​[44]​
	The momentous change in believers’ circumstances, which Paul describes in these bold images of being freed from slavery to sin in order to become slaves of God/righteousness, is effected by God, not by human effort.  It is liberation, not revolution.  Such is Paul’s view of the human predicament, and it is interpretative slight of hand to replace his idea of a real empowerment by the Spirit with ethicizing exhortations alone.  Paul does not formulate a system of ethics, in the sense of some humanly contrived ideas of the good and of how to attain it; instead, he proclaims an infusion of a divine power that makes possible a moral transformation.  Yet this impartation of divine Spirit does not reduce the moral agency of believers, but instead enhances it.  This is why, along with the declarations of the new situation of believers here and elsewhere (e.g., baptized into Christ’s death, the old self crucified with him, freed from the law of sin and death), Paul also consistently summons believers to act accordingly (e.g., 6:11-13).  So, in this scheme, there is a genuine and greater moral freedom, a greater personal agency, that is now made possible by God, but that also involves believers’ volitional engagement in its exhibition.

Freedom from the Law
	Paul’s references to freedom from the Law have typically loomed large in NT scholarship, but in my view this discussion has been plagued by some widespread distortions and the foisting upon Paul of issues and ideas that he would not recognize.  In the context of this discussion, I shall simply lay out briefly what I consider to be basics of a right view of the matter.
	First, for Paul (and the NT more broadly), the “Law” (no&moj) in question is the Torah, the body of commandments that in the OT came from God via Moses and that comprised in ancient Jewish tradition the summative revelation of God’s purposes.  It is Torah in this role to which believers (Jewish and Gentile) have “died” (Rom. 7:4; Gal. 2:19), and from which they are now released (Gal. 3:23-27).  Paul was not a philosopher of religion, but an apostle to the Gentiles.  Contrary to a whole line of theologians (from Luther onward), Paul did not set out grand, abstract conceptions of two alternative types of religiousness, one characterized by “law” and commandments, and another by “grace”, the one supposedly concerned with seeking to establish one’s righteousness by self-effort and invidious distinctions between righteous and lesser souls, and the other supposedly a simple existential dependence upon God.  I contend that Paul’s references to the Law were, instead, driven by two powerful convictions (both of which were based on his own experiences of “revelation”, as cited in Gal. 1:15-16).  First, the crucified and risen Christ uniquely bears the divine image and glory, making the Torah now superannuated as the definitive revelation of God’s purposes (esp. 2 Cor. 3:12-18).  Second, on the basis of their faith in Christ, God now welcomes Gentiles as full members of the elect, without their also having to make a proselyte conversion to Torah, and Paul has been specifically appointed by God to declare this and to secure their obedience to the Gospel of Christ.  
	So, against those Jewish believers who taught that Gentiles must complete their conversion to the God of Israel by a commitment to Torah-observance in addition to their faith in Christ, Paul insisted that Gentile believers were free from any such requirement.  Through Christ alone they were fully enfranchised by God, and should be treated accordingly by Jewish believers.  That is, Paul’s references to freedom from Torah, and being redeemed from “under Torah” (Gal. 4:4) were prompted by the attempts of others—specifically, other Jewish Christians—to impose Torah-observance as a necessary further condition for Gentile believers in order for them to be treated as full co-religionists.  
Paul appears to have had no interest in discouraging Jewish believers from observing Torah, however, so long as they did not require it of Gentile believers.  What else are we to make of 1 Cor. 9:19-23, for example?  His sole anxiety about the Torah arose from any promotion of it that seemed to treat faith in Christ as insufficient for salvation or that impeded the full acceptance of Gentile believers as Gentiles.  
	Moreover, for Paul, Israel’s “blindness” (2 Cor. 3:12-18), “hardening” (Rom. 11:7), “stumbling” (Rom. 9:30-33), and “ignorance” (Rom 10:1-4) do not represent some inferior form of religiosity of “works-righteousness”.  Instead, these phrases specifically refer to an inability or unwillingness to recognize Jesus as the eschatological means of redemption, in light of whom Torah is now superannuated as the definition of righteousness before God.  Quite simply, for Paul, the sole problem with Torah is that it is not Christ!​[45]​  Torah is for Paul genuinely divine revelation, but it is not the definitive revelation.  Doing justice to this christological heart of Paul’s discussion of Torah is a crucial failing in much NT scholarship on the topic, along with a seriously ill-informed characterization of Judaism and Christianity.​[46]​
	In Paul’s view, thus, for Gentile believers freedom from the Law is simply freedom from its imposition upon them as an additional condition for their salvation and acceptance.  For Jewish believers this means freedom to go beyond Torah to recognize Christ as the definitive basis of salvation and to embrace Gentile believers as full co-heirs of God’s grace.  This is how I take the “freedom which we have in Christ Jesus” in Gal. 2:4, for in the immediate context Paul’s defence of this freedom seems to overlap with his concern “that the truth of the Gospel might be preserved for you [Gentiles]” (2:5).  Freedom from the Law is not some abstract principle, but is a theological point with powerful social/ecclesial consequences.  It is a practical freedom of Gentile believers from the requirement of proselyte-conversion to Torah-observance, and a corresponding freedom of Jewish believers to welcome Gentile believers as such, solely on the basis of their shared faith in Christ.
Freedom and Love
	I come now to my most important point, which is the connection of freedom and love in the NT.  As noted briefly already, the freedom celebrated and anticipated in the NT is entirely a divine gift, and it flows from redemptive actions by God and Christ that are typically portrayed as motivated by “love” (a)ga&ph).  It is patently clear that “love” is an important component in the NT vocabulary.  As a concordance will readily show, both the noun and the verb are used frequently and across the entire NT (a)ga&ph 116 uses, a)gapa&w 143 uses).  The overwhelming preference for these terms over other Greek words for “love” may derive from several factors, including their frequent use in the LXX.​[47]​  But the specific behavioral import of these terms in the NT derives from the redemptive acts of love that form the heart of the faith proclaimed in these texts.  Love for a deity is not without parallel in the Roman setting, but the strong emphasis on God’s love for humans is unusual in the wider religious discourse of the time.​[48]​  This makes the NT emphasis on God’s redemptive love all the more noteworthy.  
	A selection of NT references will suffice to make the basic point.  In Revelation 1:5, Jesus is referred to as the one “who loved us and loosed us from our sins through his blood,” the term “loosed” [lusanti] an obvious image of freedom.  Similarly, in Gal. 2:20, Paul movingly declares his life of faith “in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me,” the latter phrase obviously referring to Jesus’ redemptive death.  Rom. 5:8 refers to God’s love manifested toward sinners in Christ’s redemptive death.  In Eph 2:4-7, out of God’s great love, believers have been raised from death in sin to new life with Christ, with still more glorious gifts to come.  
	This gives to the freedom celebrated in the NT a distinctive flavor.  It is the gift of divine love.  But the still more radical distinction characterizing NT freedom is that it is intended to promote in those liberated by this love an answering love, for God and Christ, and also, just as emphatically, for others as well.  This latter emphasis on love for others is particularly unusual in the Roman world.  NT freedom involves being emboldened and liberated from past habits and all other deflecting and constraining forces, so that one is able to relate to others on the basis of a giving, empowering, caring love that is to be patterned after God’s love.  
	In addition to his appeal to the Galatians not to sacrifice their freedom in Christ and enslave themselves through a misguided notion that they must supplement their faith in Christ with a further conversion to Torah-obedience (Gal. 5:1-6), Paul also warns them not to use their freedom simply for self-gratification (5:13-15).  Instead, he urges in bold terms “through love become slaves to one another” (5:13), declaring that love of others fulfils the whole Torah (v. 14).  Moreover, in 1 Cor 8, Paul exhorts the Corinthians to avoid their God-given freedom becoming a cause of discouragement and weakening of faith in other believers, and in the following chapter he lays out his own behavior as an example.   Here, he declares that he has chosen to forego his special rights as apostle (e.g., to claim financial support, for himself and a wife, from his churches), making himself “a slave to all” for their sake, to win them to faith and salvation, and thereby share in the blessings of the Gospel (esp. 9:19-23).  In 1 Cor. 10:23—11:1, Paul contrasts a selfist notion of freedom (“All things are lawful,” 10:23) with seeking the welfare of others (10:24).  Thereafter, in an extended discussion of differences over eating meat that might have come to the market from pagan altars, and about eating with unbelievers (10:25-33), Paul warns against exercising one’s personal freedom in the matter without regard for others.  Instead, he advocates a concern to avoid offence “to Jews or to Greeks or to the church of God” (v. 32).
	In a somewhat similar tone, 1 Pet. 2:16 urges believers to “live as free people, yet do not use your freedom as a pretext for evil.” In the immediate context, this freedom is to comprise doing God’s will (v. 15), which includes due honor to everyone, love for other believers (th\n a)delfo&thta), a proper fear of God, and honoring the Emperor (v. 16).
	In this NT emphasis upon agapē as the central responsibility that believers owe to others, we see the profoundly social dimension to NT freedom.  There simply is no extended attention given to freedom as the exercise of power on one’s own behalf and without having to consider others.  The only freedom that we see advocated in the NT is one that requires others for it to be exercised.  One cannot exhibit this distinctive freedom except in relationship to others.  
	The common form of Roman freedom likewise required others (especially slaves) in order for it to be to be exercised, indeed, even for it to be defined.  But this kind of freedom was always at the expense of others, their labor and service enabling one to enjoy a freedom from labor and service.  Moreover, as noted briefly already, in all the typical notions of freedom in the Roman era (and in our day as well), whether national, social/political, or inward-philosophical, to take account of others (other peoples/nations, groups, or persons), to allow one’s actions to be shaped by others, represents either a real or potential threat to one’s freedom, or, at best a necessary constraint upon one’s freedom (e.g., in the interests of social peace).  In short, there is no positive role of others in this sort of idea of freedom, except perhaps, e.g., that one’s freedom from manual labor or other objectionable tasks required others to perform these tasks.  One’s leisure was typically enabled directly by the labor of others, especially slaves.  
	In the NT, however, freedom is not to be exercised at the expense of others but with their interests and needs in mind.  It is precisely the freedom to be “for others.”  That is, the freedom advocated in the NT requires others, not to relieve one from labor, but as objects of the love that comprises this freedom.  This definition of freedom is, to my knowledge, unprecedented in the Roman world.  Indeed, most people, then and now, for whom freedom consists in autarchy would likely not recognize as freedom what the NT advocates.  This radically different view of freedom simply has to be faced seriously in considering what kind of contribution the NT might make to our concerns today.  In any case, this idea of freedom-for-love/others is perhaps the most notable and distinctive feature of freedom in the NT.
	It is also very important to note that the exhortations to the loving exercise of freedom are directed particularly to those in socially advantaged positions.  Loving service may more naturally be thought to be the duty urged on those in subservient positions in patriarchal and hierarchical societies, such as slaves, wives, and children.  It is all the more important, thus, to note that those urged to loving regard for others in the NT are the entire body of believers, with specific exhortations in the “household codes” notably directed to husbands (Eph. 5:25-33; Col. 5:19).  This suggests that the love-exhortations were not intended primarily to promote or reinforce a traditional hierarchical/patriarchal social-structure, and were not directed primarily to promote the subservience of those in more vulnerable social relationships.  Instead, however imperfectly it was conceived or actualized, the NT articulation of freedom as love for others represents a genuinely novel, even counter-cultural vision in which those who enjoy comparatively greater social status are to invest themselves in the interests of others.

Concluding Reflections
Those who require an explicit scriptural text to authorize any thought or action will find the absence of NT statements on political liberation either frustrating or a dubious justification for conservatism.  Those whose vision of liberation is essentially a hastily baptized version of Greek traditions of autarchy will find the NT vision of freedom incomprehensible and repugnant.  I suggest, however, that both responses reflect shallow thinking.  In any case, neither represents an authentic engagement with the NT.   
	As we have noted earlier, the NT does not teach about political liberation because the sorts of actions open today (especially political organization) were not available or even conceived then.  But the strong affirmation and enhancement of personal moral agency in the NT are most compatible with social and political environments that make ample room for freedom of conscience and action.  The agapē urged in the NT requires a real measure of personal freedom in order to be exercised authentically.  It is not possible to render the love advocated in the NT under compulsion and coercion.  So, e.g., freedom of religion and conscience, and freedom from intimidation and oppressive social relationships are essential for the cultivation of opportunities for true faith and loving freedom to be exercised.
	The eschatological vision that fuels NT teaching on freedom and other matters has been effectively lost in most versions of Christianity, along with the concomitant radical view of evil, with unfortunate results.  Conservative Christianity has tended to identify too readily the Kingdom of God with this or that political regime (from Constantine onward), whereas liberal Christianity has tended to under-estimate the depth of evil and in its own ways has tended to assume that radical change for the better can be achieved by well-intentioned people.  But the eschatological outlook of the NT reflects a profound, if jarring, view of the human predicament, which at least seems more realistic, in view of the daily headlines.  Moreover, that same eschatological hope also requires a stubborn refusal to confuse any human regime with God’s Kingdom, which should allow scope for critique of all regimes, even those established to promote freedom.
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^35	  Perhaps the concern was that harsh words and actions would easily be taken by household slaves as contradicting the Christian profession of the masters, i.e., hypocrisy, which could lead slaves (whose profession of faith may well have been prompted by their owners’) to respond negatively to Christian faith.  Bradley (Slaves and Masters, 114) notes only the exhortations to slaves, and seriously misrepresents matters in claiming that they simply show “how Christian leaders absorbed and indirectly supported the ideology of the slave-owning classes in Roman society at large.”
^36	  See the review of studies by R. A. Horsley, “Paul and Slavery:  A Critical Alternative to Recent Readings,” Semeia 83/84 (1998) 178-82 [153-200].  The most serious challenge has come from Allen D. Callahan, “Paul’s Epistle to Philemon:  Toward an Alternative Argumentum,” HTR 86 (1993) 357-76; id., Embassy of Onesimus:  The Letter of Paul to Philemon (Valley Forge, VA:  Trinity Press International, 1997).  
^37	  For an effective challenge to the traditional view that Onesimus was a fugitive, see esp. Peter Lampe, “Keine Sklavenflucht des Onesimus,” ZNW 76 (1985) 135-37.  
^38	  If Onesimus had been sent to Paul by Philemon, Paul may be referring to any extra expenses incurred by Onesimus in v. 18, perhaps through over-staying his original mission.  In any case, contra  Harrill (Slaves in the New Testament, 13), who strangely represents the verbs in this verse as subjunctive (!) and claims that the debt is only a theoretical possibility, the phrasing (ei) de& ti h)di&khse&n se) suggests some real cost or debt that has somehow been incurred.
^39	  E.g., had Paul simply wanted Onesimus consigned to him, he might have requested this without sending Onesimus back; but this would make more sense if Paul hoped for his manumission.  See also Patterson’s forthright comments on the matter (“Paul, Slavery and Freedom,” 270-71).
^40	  Moreover,  in assessing how earliest Christians may have regarded and treated slaves, scholars commonly overlook the commandments in the Torah on the matter, which significantly restricted the powers of owners over slaves in comparison with Roman legal tradition:  e.g., killing and wounding (Exod. 21:20-27), sexual relations (Deut. 21:10-14), and returning fugitive slaves (Deut.23:15-16).  Both NT references and manuscript artifacts show that the Pentateuch was read and treasured as Scripture in many/most early Christian circles.  Also, studies of Roman-era slavery regularly ignore the question of how Jewish practice may have been shaped by Torah.  On this, see E. E. Urbach, “The Laws Regarding Slavey As a Source for Social History of the Period of the Second Temple, the Mishnah and the Talmud,” in Papers of the Institute of Jewish Studies London. Brown Classics in Judaica, Volume 1, ed. J. G. Weiss (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989), 1-94; cf. Paul V. M. Flesher, Oxen, Women, or Citizens?  Slaves in the System of the Mishnah (Atlanta:  Scholars Press, 1988).  Dale B. Martin, “Slavery and the Ancient Jewish Family,” in The Jewish Family in Antiquity, ed. Shaye J. D. Cohen (Atlanta:  Scholars Press, 1993), 113-29, claims no significant difference between ancient Jewish and pagan slave practice, but the evidence he offers does not really speak to his claim.  The question is important in so far as Paul’s own attitudes and those of his Gentile converts who included those who had previously associated themselves with synagogues would likely have been influenced to some degree by Jewish slave-laws/practices, not merely by general Roman law on the matter.  Peter J. Tomson, Paul and the Jewish Law:  Halakha in the Letters of the Apostle to the Gentiles (CRINT; Assen: Van Gorcum; Minneapolis:  Fortress Press, 1990), shows that Paul employed Torah positively in shaping Christian behavior.
^41	  German Protestant scholarship in particular seems to have focused on these theological issues, often producing very erudite but somewhat abstract discussions, among which Niederwimmer (Der Begriff der Freiheit) is a good example.  Among English-language studies, C. K. Barrett, Freedom and Obligation: A Study of the Epistle to the Galatians (London:  SPCK, 1985); J. D. G. Dunn, Christian Liberty:  A New Testament Perspective (Carlisle:  Paternoster Press, 1993); and Graham Shaw, The Cost of Authority:  Manifpulation and Freedom in the New Testament (London:  SCM, 1983), illustrate the very different sorts of issues that are pursued.
^42	  I take “the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus” as a particularly memorable way of designating God’s Spirit, as seems congruent with the numerous subsequent references in vv. 4-17 to God’s Spirit as the enabling moral force by which believers are now to live out God’s will.  I see “the law of sin and death” as the “other law” whose baleful effects are described in Rom. 7:23, not the Torah. 
^43	  Dale Martin contends that the idea of service/slavery to gods was not as foreign to Greek tradition as some NT scholars have claimed (Slavery as Salvation, xiv-xvi); but in Greek and Roman traditions we do not have this motif connected with statements of freedom.  
^44	  Among the works of the flesh listed here, at least most of them fit this description:  fornication, impurity, enmities, strife, jealousy, anger, quarrels, dissensions, factions, and envy.  Among the fruit of the Spirit, love peace, patience, kindness, generosity, faithfulness and gentleness readily fit.
^45	  I consciously adapt here a memorable statement by E. P. Sanders, “In short, this is what Paul finds wrong in Judaism:  it is not Christianity” (Paul and Palestinian Judaism [Philadelphia:  Fortress Press, 1977], 552).  I think that Sander’s statement is both anachronistic (as if in Paul’s time and mind there was a “Christianity” to contrast with a “Judaism”), and also fails to capture the precise issue for Paul, which is the surpassing significance of Jesus.  Notwithstanding other criticisms of Sanders on some points, I think he is basically correct in his broad conclusions about Paul on these matters (esp. pp. 549-52).
^46	  Cf., e.g., Schlier, “e)leu&qeroj,” 496-98.
^47	  See, e.g., discussions of the terms by G. Schneider, EDNT 1:8-12; W.Günther and H.-G. Link, NIDNTT 2:538-47 (and the copious bibliography in the latter article).
^48	  Human love for god(s) was usually referred to as an eros that involved a desire for association with the divine/beautiful.  See, e.g., Werner Bierwaltes, “The Love of Beauty and the Love of God,” in Classical Mediterranean Spirituality, ed. A. H. Armstrong (New York:  Crossroad, 1986), 293-313.
